Unprovability of theorems of complexity theory in weak number theories  by Leivant, Daniel
Theoretical Computer Science 18 (1982) 259-268 
North-Holland Publishing Company 
259 
UNPROVABILITY OF THEOREMS OF COMPLEXITY 
THEORY IN WEAK NUMBER THEORIlES 
Daniel LEIVANT 
Department of Computer Science, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, U.S.A. 
Communicated by A. Meyer 
Received November 1979 
Revised September 1980 
Introduction 
Since 1978 there has been some interest in theorems of Computer Science that 
cannot be proved in certain formal theories. That such phcnrlmena deserve study 
was suggested already in [6]. The recent results fall into two distinct groups. On 
the one hand there are properties of complex programming constructs that cannot 
be proved in formal theories as strong as full (impredicative) Second Order Arith- 
metic [ 15, 3, 4, 123. The formal theories are here natural and strong, and the 
significance of such independence results is therefore evident. On the other hand 
there are theorems of complexity theory that cannot be proved in certain weak 
number theories [ 14, 1, 2, 111. In particular, various forms of a theorem of Rabin 
[17] on the existence of recursive sets that are almost everywhere difficult to decide 
have been shown underivable in these theories [ 14, la]. The significance of unprova- 
bili:y results of the latter kind depends on one’s confidence in the intrinsic interest 
of the formal theories considered+ The purpose of this note .is to obtain the sharpest 
possible result on the independence of Rabin’s Theorem, while at the same time 
to argue that the significance of the formal theories considered is limited, and that 
consequently the interest of such independence results lies mainly in their technical 
corollaries. 
1. l&-Arithmetic 
We briefly recall some notions and observations, for the most part well known. 
By the language of arithmetic we mean the first order language with two predicate 
letters =, <, with 0, 1 as constants and with function symbols for ail primitive 
recursive functions. A formula in the language of arithmetic is true if it is valid in 
the standard model of arithmetic whose domain is the set of natural numbers, and 
where each function symbol is interpreted as the primitive recursive functi,on it 
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denotes. Given a formula 4 of the language of arithmetic, there are formulas # of 
the form Q&19 where Q is a block i;bf alternating existential and universal quantifiers, 
@a1 is quantifier free, and such that (b e @ it; provable. (By the Matijasevic- 
Robinson-Davis-Putnam Theorerm [5] & may be assumed to be an equation p = 0, 
where p is a polynomial.) This Normal Form Thesrem gives rise to Kleene’s 
definition of the arithmetical hierarchy, by whi%h a formula 4 in the language of 
arithmetic is Bk or Ck if some r(/ as above exists with k quantifiers in Q of which 
the first is universal or existential, respectively. A fOrmula is cZos,ed if it contains 
no free variabIes. I&Arithmetic is the first order theory in the language of arithmetic 
whose axioms are the true & closed formulas. Of course, this set of axioms is not 
recursively enumerable (r.e.). 
In one sense &-Arithmetic is a very strong theory: since the set of axioms is 
not r.e., no r.e. theory can prove all axioms of &-Arithmetic. Moreover, the axioms 
Of &-Arithmetic include many major theorems and open problems of Number 
Theory. Fermat’s b Last Theorem’, Goldbach’s Conjecture and the Four Colors 
Theorem are actually 27,: the existence of infinitely many twin primes and of 
infinitely many perfect numbers are &. A number of open problems are corollaries 
of Riemann’s Hypothesis, whirzh itself is equivalent (modulo weak methods of 
proof) to a Uz formula [5]. Also, all theorems on consistency and relative consistency 
of r.e. theories may be encoded as HI formulas. If 3x 4(x) is a true C3 closed 
formula, then 4(E) is a true 272 closed formula for some numeral; fi; so all true C3 
closed formulas are theorems of &Arithmetic. The schema of irlduction, 
4mbVx [&x)+&x+l)]+Vx&x) 
is 22 when q5 is &, & when 4 is Cl; hence instances of induction for closed 111 
and Ct formulas are also theorems of &Arithmetic. 
At the same time &-Arithmetic is weak, since there is an instance of induction 
on a & formula & that cannot bc proved in &-Arithmetic [16, 131. 
A true & closed formula is, in a sense, constructively true: if VX 3y 40(x, y) is 
a true closed formula, where 40 is quantifier free, then the existence of y for each 
x is witnessed by a total recursive function f, i.e. Vx &(x, f(x)) (note that this 
formula is not necessarily in the language of arithmetic). Conversely, every construc- 
tively true closed formula is a theorem of &-Arithmetic. For if 
#=Vx*3y,*. 
l vxk gyk d’dxl, l l l 3 Xkr yl, l l l I) Yk) 
is a closed formula of the language of arithmetic with &, quantifier free, and if 
there exist recursive functions that yield each yi from x1, . . . , Xi(i=l,. . . , k), then 
there are Turing machines lM1, . . . 5 .&& for which the following formula 4” is true: 
t/j:, . . . Xk 3v,. . . tl& 3yl.. . yk 
“vl codes a calculation of Ml on input x1 with yl as Output” A l l l A “uk 
codes a calculation of Mk on input X1 . . . xk with yk as output” 
+4X1 9 l l l 9 xk, yl, - l l 3 ykh 
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4*, the construcfive version of qb, is a Hz cloe*d formula which implies 4 in First 
Order Logic. Thus, if a formula of the language of arithmetic callnot be proved in 
&-Arithmetic, then 4” is not true. 
2. Non-constructiveness of a thieorem of Pd. Rabin 
2.L Unprovability in l&-Arithmetic of the linear Rabin Theorem 
M. Rabin [17] proved the existence, for each total recursive function h, of a 
recursive set R of natural numbers for which no recognizer runs infinitely often in 
time O(h). This is easily seen to be equivalent to neither R nor J? having an infinite 
subset I decidable in time O(h), by the following argument essentially due to A.R. 
Meyer. For the forward implication, assume that such an I existed, say I c R; then 
one could run simultaneously t’he recognizers for I and R, accept as soon as one 
of the two accepts, reject when both reject; that would be a recognizer for H 
accepting all members of I in time O(h). Conversely, given a recognizer for R that 
runs infinitely often in tim.e O(h), say accepting infinitely often in time p * h (1x15, 
one could run this recognizer but reject an input x if p * h(IxI) steps are made 
without a result; that would be a iecognizer in time O(h) for an infinite subset of 
R. We refer to the case: h(x) = 1x1 =log&) as the linear Rabin Theorem. 
The following theorem strengthens in several respects a result of Lipton [l4]. 
Comparison with [ 141 follows. 
Theorem. The linear Rabin Tibeorem is not a theorem of li’$Arith,metic. 
Proof. Suppose that the linear Rabin Theorem were provable i,n &-Arithmetic, 
i.e. from a finite number of true & formulas. It is easy to see tha,t the conjunction 
of a finite number of true 172 formulas is implied by a true n2 formula; thus, the 
linear Rabin Theorem would ble provable from a certain true & formula C#J. Without 
loss of generality, we assume that 4 also implies the elementary properties of C. 
Suppose 4 is VX 3y &(x, y), =where &, is quantifier free. Let f be a total recursive 
function for which VX 3y <f(x) &(x, y). We assume without loss of generality that 
f is strictly increasing and that f(x) > 2 #x, where # denotes exponentiation. 
Moreover, using padding we can make f(x) computable by a Turing machine Mf 
in time <p * log f(x) for some constant p (where log x denotes [log2 xl). 
Let ( l l 9 ) be a primitive recursive coding scheme for sequences of natural 
numbers, with a primitive recursive decoding function 7~ satisfying 
n(i, (x0, l l l 9 Xk)) = Xj for i = 0, . . . , k. (see e.g. [9]); let p (k, x)=(x, . . . , x) (k X’S). 
For each integer a let Ia be the set of integers a, f(a), f (f (a)), . . . , f’(a), . . . , where 
the superscript denotes the number of function compositions. Thus x E Ia is 
expressed by the recursive formula 
3k<x3v~~(k,x)~[~(O,v)=a~Pdj<k~(j-tli,v)-f(~(j,~)) 
/\ rr(k, v) =x]. (*c) 
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We show that Il is decidable in linear time for all a. Let Me be a Turing machine 
that on input a, z simulates Mf to generate the sequence zo = a, Zi+l = f(Zi), until 
wme Zi 2 log2 z, or until p * log z steps are performed in the calculation of some 
Zl, whichever comes first. If q > log2 z is reached and Zj = z, then Me outputs 1, 0 
otherwise. !iince f is lstrictly increasing, log f(x) > x, and Mf runs on input x in time 
log f(~ ), /kf” is a recognizer for 3if’(a ) = z, and MC (a, z) runs in time 
/--I 
SE p*lOgZi+p*lOgZ 
j = 1 
4~*i~110giz4m*logz 
where m = 2 * p. Also, the calculation of Me(a, z), as a list of instantaneous descrip- 
tions, can be coded by an integer v whose number of digits is Cm * log z * ((m + 
1)*legz+loga),sov~z#(m*(m+l)*z*a). 
‘FQ~ any integers a, k and Turing machine M, if M converges on a,. . . , f’-‘(a), 
then there is an integer s with a binary representation of length k + 1 coding 
acceptance by M among a, . . . , fk-l(a), in the sense that for i C k the ith binary 
digit of s (starting to count from 0 with the rightmost digit) is 0 iff M(f’(a)) = 0 
(i.e. iff 3v, w [w(O,v)=a rtVj<i tr(j+l, v)=f(rr(j,v))~{w codes a complete 
calculation of M with v(i, v) as input and 0 as output)]). We say that s is an a,f-code 
for M up to j, for each j s k. Given s as ar? oracle, deciding membership of f’(a) 
(i c k) in the set R decided by M is performed in linear time by scanning s and 
yielding its ith digit. (We assume that the input of all Turing machines is given in 
binary.) 
Let L denote the language of arithmetic with +, * and # as the only function 
symbols, augmented with a new constant c. Consider the following set r of formulas 
of L, where y = f(x) and similar statements are suitably interpreted by formulas of 
L: 
0) “f is 2 total increasing function that majorizes a witnessing function for C#J 
a~ v. pull as addition, multiplication and exponentiation”: 
vx3y[y=f(x)A3zcy~0(x,z)Af(x+l)>y~x#x~x*x=CY+x]; 
(2) “The function Mf(c, X) decides I=, and Mle runs in linear time”: 
Vz3v<z#(m*(m+l)*z*c) 
“v is 
inpul 
(a) 
(b) 
(3)k c 2 E; 
the code of a calculation of the Turing machine with code e” on 
c, Z, 
wirh output 1 if z E let 0 otherwise; 
where the calculation’s length is <fi * log z.“; 
(4) “For every Turing machine M, 
[(Vi < c M converges on f’(c)) 
+ 
(3sc2#(c+2)+ qn f, c-code for M up to c)]“. 
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For each k, if Nk is the standard model with c interpreted as k, then Nk is a 
model of L which satisfies (l), (2), (3)k (whence also (35 for i < k) and (4). The 
Compactness Theorem of Model Theory states that if every finite subset of a set 
of fnyit order formulas has a model, then the whole set has a model Thus there is 
a model N of L satisfying all formulas in K 
Let 2 be the subset of the domain of N consisting of those elements x that are 
< (in the sense of N) than the interpretation in N of f’(c) for some (standard) 
integer i (i.e. for which a Cr formula expressing 3z (t =f’(c) A x < z) is true in N). 
Since f is strictly increasing, x <f’(c) implies f(x) <f”‘(c), so 2 is closed under 
the interpretation of f in N; and since (1) is true in N, 2 is also closed under the 
interpretation of +, * and # in N. The closure properties of 2 imply that we may 
define a model 1M of L by restricting to 2 the interpretation in N of the constant 
and function symbols of L. Formula (1) and so also 4 are true in M by the definition 
of 2. Formulas (29, (3)k and (4) can all be expressed in L as Z& formulas, and it is 
easy to see that if a ZZ, formula is true in a model, then it is true in a submodel 
thereof, Thus all formulas of r are true in M: 
If 1M is a Turing machine of 1M that converges on all elements of I,, then the 
premise of (4) is true in 11M. Since (4) is true in 1w; there is in M an f, c-code s for 
M up to c. In M if x <f’(c) and x = fk(c), then k c i, since f is strictly increasing 
in 1M; thus, in IM the set Zc (i.e. the extension of (*)) consists exactly of t’he elements 
f’(c) with i standard. Since by (3) c is non-standard, it follows that s is a code for 
all of Zc, i.e. Vz, k [z = fk(c) + (M(z) = 0 H the kth digit of s is 0)] is true in IM. 
Hence, for each set Z? recursive in the sense of M; membership in R among elements 
of Zc is decidable in 1M in linear time. In addition, the formula V’x 3y > x y E Zc, 
expressing that Ie is infinite, is true in 1M by the definition of 2. 
Thus IM is a model of the formula expressing the existence of some c for which 
I, is infinite, decidable in linear time, and such that for each Turing machine 
recognizing a set R, membership in R among elements of Zc is decidled in linear 
time. This formula implies the negation of the linear Rabin Theorem, since for 
each R at least one of IC n R and Ic n Z? must be infinite, and both must be decidable 
in linear time. The implication is proved using only the elementary properties of 
<, which we have assumed to be implied by 4. Thus 1M is a model of 4 as well 
as of the negation of the linear Rabin’s Theorem, and the assumption that the 
linear Ratln Theorem is derived fro,m 4 has led to a contradiction. 
Corollary. There is no recursive set R for which these exists a recursive function f 
such that for each Turing machine M running in linear time, either f(M) = (x, y > 
where x, y are accepted by M, x E R and y E I?, or all numbers accepted by M are 
<f (W 
Proof. If a set R as above existed, then the constructive version of the linear Rabin 
Theorem would be true. Hence the linear Rabin Theorem would be provable in 
Z&Arithmetic, contradicting the theorem. 
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2.2. Variants of Rabin 3 Theorem provable in &Arithmetic 
Any sublinear Rabin Theorem is provable in &Arithmetic, so the theorem 
above is the sharpest possible. To see this let R be the set of natural numbers 
whose binary representation contains an even number of 1’s. Clearly, an integer 
must be completely scanned to decide membership in R, hence no infinite subset 
of R or of R’ can be decided in sublinear time. It is also easy to see that this 
argument is formalizable in &-Arithmetic, and that actually the constructive version 
of any sublinear Rabin Theorem is a theorem of Peano’s Arithmetic. 
The non-constructive nature of Rabin’s Theorem is dependent upon the require- 
ment that the set R be difficult to decide almost everywhere. It is possible to prove 
in &Arithmetic a weaker variant of Rabin’s Theorem to the effect that for each 
recursive function h there exists a recursive set R that is h-difficult to decide 
infinitely often (Hartmanis and Stearns [7]). 
2.3. Comparison with [ 141 
In 1141 Lipton considered in place of &-Arithmetic the theory whose axioms 
are the & theorems of Peano’s Arithmetic, a theory often labeled BNT, for Basic 
Number Theory ([8] and references there). The main result of [14] is that Rabin’s 
Theorem for polynomial time ii; independent of BNT. This is weaker than our main 
result in that the theorem proved independent is stronger and the theory over 
which independence isproved is weaker. 
The main theorem of [14] asserts that for eiach recursive R the statement that 
one of R, R’ contains an infinite subset decidable in polynomial time is unprovable 
in BNT. The proof of the theorem actually establishes that BNT does not prove 
+he existence of such a set R But it should be noted that the: latter independence 
result does not automatically follow from the statement of the theorem. To illustrate 
this point, consider a formula &) independent of BNT. Then the formula 3x [(x = 0 A 
4) v (,x = 1 A T&] is a theorem of BNT, although (x’ = 0 r~ 4) v (X = 1 A -@) is not, 
for each numeral 2. 
Finally, Joseph and Young [8] have observed that the proof in [M] applies not 
to arbitrary recursive sets R, but only to sets that are proved in Peano’s Arithmetic 
to be recursive. 
3. The relevance of BNT and Z&Arithmetic to CornpEter Science 
3.1. The constructiveness of BNT and &Arithmetic 
We noted that if ahe constructive version 4” of a formula & is tr:Je (is provable 
in Peano’s Arithmetic), then 4 is a theorem of f&-Arithmetic (of BNT, respectively). 
However, the converse is generally true only for the axioms of Z&Arithmetic. For 
example, if $(x) is a formula expressing “the xth Turing machine halts on the 
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empty input”‘, then the formula 
v’x 3y [<y 0 A $(x)) v (y = 1 A l@(X))] (*I 
is provable already in First Order Logic, but its constructive version expresses the 
recursive solvability of the halting problem, and is thus false. This nonconstructive 
aspect of BNT is due to the non-constructiveness of usual (‘classical’) First Order 
Logic on which BNT is based, 
The existing concensus is that the elementary part of constructive re’asoning is 
correctly captured by Heyting’s (Intuitionistic) Arithmetic HA (possibly augmented 
by Markov’s Principle; see [19]). Clearly, HA is not contained even in /72-Arith- 
metic, since all instances of induction are axioms of HA. (However, all theorems 
of HA without implications or negations are provable in &Arithmetic (see [19, 
Section 4.4.61) though not in BNT.) Conversely, (*) is an example of a theorem of 
BNT which is not provable in HA. For an even simpler example consider a formula 
4 undecided in HA; then 4 v -14 is a theorem of ENT but not of HA. Thus BNT 
as well as &Arithmetic fail to satisfy the di,sjunction property, which is satisfied 
by a theory T if for each theorem of I;r of the form 4 v ~3 either ~5 or $ is a theorem 
of T. The disjunction property is often viewed as an essential test for the construc- 
tiveness of a formal theory. 
Theorems of BNT may fail to be constructive also if one understarlds “4 is 
constructive” to mean that 4 is provable &, i.e. q5 w 4 is a theorem (of Peano’s 
Arithmetic say) for some n2 formula ~5.~ 
Proposition. TIlere is a theorem 4 of &Arithmetic that is not provablIy equivalent 
to any I& formula, not even in Peano’s Arithmetic augmented with all true I& 
formulas. (Moreover, C$ is derived from the axioms of &-Arithmetic using propositional 
inferences only .) 
Proof. Let 1’ denote Peano’s Arithmetic augmented with all true Z7, formulas. Let 
Pr be a canonical 2~. provability predicate for T [18]. Let Con and ConCon be 17~ 
formulas expressing the consistency of T and of T +Con, respectively. Let 4 be 
the formula Con + ConCon. Write I- Q! for “the. formula cy is provable in T”, and 
5~1 for the numeral for the canonical (SGodel) code for cy. 
Arguing by contradiction, suppose that 
for some n2 formula rt/. Then 
I-i$+Con. (2) 
This implies that 
t-b% (3) 
by the following argument due to Mreisel [lo]. 
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We use the derivability conditions (relativiaer: to T) for Pr (see [18, p. 827)). 
I=- ‘74 + Pr(‘1#‘), (4) 
by the second derivability condition. By the fix% and third conditions, (2) implies 
t-Pr(r*--7@1) -, Pr(‘Conl). (9 
Finally, by Godel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem for T, 
l- Pr(rCon7) + icon. (6) 
Combining (41, (5) and (6), 
t- -7 J/ --, 7Con, 
which with (2) implies (3). 
But (I) and (3) imply that Con + ConCon is a theorem of T, i.e. that the theory 
T + Con proves its own consistency, contradicting Godel’s Second Incompleteness 
Theorem. 
3.2. On the thesis thaf BNT is adequate as a canonical formal system for Computer 
Science 
The kinship of true 272 and constructively true formulas has led Lipton [P4] to 
put forward the thes#is that BNT is an adequate canonical formal theory for 
Computer Science. We propose that the reader assess the merits if this suggestion 
with in mind ;he observations of Section 3.1 about non-constructive aspects of 
BNT, and the following remarks concerning the strength of BNT and the epistemol- 
ogical consistency of Lipton’s Thesis. 
We mentioned that thiere are Cl formulas for which induction is not provable 
even in Uz-Arithmetic. This is a weakness that we suspect few computer scientists 
would accept of their canonical formal system. The absence in &Arithmetic of 
weak instances of induction is also reflected by severe anomalies of models of 
&-Arithmetic. As an example, consider the following application of the Complete- 
ness Theorem, sometimes dubbed ‘the overspill principle’ and due in this context 
to Joseph and Young [S], to show that such a model may contain a set S that is 
(in the sense of the model) finite, r.e., but not recursive. 
Let T be a. formal theory and #(x, y) a formula of the language of arithmetic. 
Assume that T proves the elementary properties of addition. By the Completeness 
Theorem for’First Order Logic T proves induction on 4 with respect to X, 
ifi for each model _M of T and each element y of M, the set D&,,, of elements x of 
for which @(x, y) is true in M either is unbounded in or contains a last 
5:lement. Let Q!$Y, y) be a Cl formula for which induction with respect to x is not 
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provable in &Arithmetic [16, 131. Thus, there is a model M of &-Arithmetic 
and an element y of M such that the set S =Qzy is bounded but has no last 
element. Since induction over & formulas is provable in &Arithmetic, ,6 cannot 
be equal to Dti,= for some z and recursive relation +5(x, z), i.e. S is not recursive 
in the sense of M Joseph and Young ,[$I showed that models of &-Arithmetic 
may be plagued by even more exotic maladies. 
Furthermore, the suggestion that BNT be adopted as canonical system seems to 
us ,pistemologically inconsistent. BNT is proposed as an alternative to Peano’s 
Arithmetic because of the alleged non-constructive nature of those proofs in Peano’s 
Arithmetic that use complex formulas. At the same time, many formulas are justified 
as axioms of BNT precisely by these rejected proofs. To illustrate this point, let n 
be some large integer, and consider the fragment PA, of Peano”s Arithmetic in 
which induction is allowed only on U, formulas. Then the formula Con, expressing 
the consistency of PA, is Z7,; also, Con, can be proved in Peano’s Arithmetic, but 
only by using induction on a D,, +I formula. Thus, Con, is an axiom of BNT, whose 
simplest proof in Peano’s Arithmetic is I-ighly ‘non-constructive’, Should Lipton’s 
Thesis be accepted, a typical formal proof in Computer Science would consist of 
two parts, of which the first would provide derivations in Peano’s Arithmetic for 
axioms of BNT, using arbitrarily complex formulas, and the would derive 
some theorems from these axioms. 
3.3. The significance of independence results over BNT and L&-Arithmetic 
It has been suggested [2, 81 that independence results over BNT and & 
Arithmetic are valuable in calibrating the proof theoretic complexity of theorems 
of Computer Science. The most useful classification of proofs of Peano’s Arithmetic 
is by the complexity of instances of induction they use (also useful are classifications 
by length and other structural properties, which are irrelevant here). However, if 
(b is a formula independent of BNT, then all we know is that ,fi cannot have a 
proof in Peano’s Arithmetic of the particular form mentioned at the end of Section 
3.2 above; among these excluded proofs are arbitrarily complex ones, but not all 
proofs that use induction only on C1 formulas. We therefore doubt that indepen- 
dence over BNT is a promising classification principle. Unprovability of 4 in BN?’ 
does exclude a proof of 4 by induction on closed &$ and Cl formulas only, but 
this is already excluded by 4 being underivable in the much weaker theory PAI. 
It seems that independence results lover BNT or &Arithmetic teach us something 
about the non-constructiveness of the independent formula rather than of its 
potential proofs. If 4 is found unprovable in &Arithmetic, then 4 is not construc- 
tively true (as illustrated by the admittedly undramatic corollary above). Similarly, 
if 4 is independent of BNT, then no recursive Skolem functions witnessing its 
prenex form (as in Section 1 above) can be proved in Peano’s Arithmetic to witness 
# (though this does not even guarantee that the witnessing functions are not 
provably recursive in Peano’s Arithmetic). 
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